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I. INTRODUCTION

Citizens of Colorado and tourists from around the world have
enjoyed floating Colorado's world class rivers for years. They have
made the rafting industry into an economic force, producing more
t Lori Potter practices environmental, public land, and water law as a member of
the firm of Kelly I Haglund IGarnsey + Kahn LLC Denver, Colorado. Ms. Potter serves
as counsel for defendants in Gateview Ranch, Inc. v. Cannibal Outdoor Network, Inc.,
Case No. 01CV53, Gunnison County District Court, in which a rafting company and its
owners are being sued for civil trespass for floating through private land. The views
expressed in this article are the personal views of the authors, and do not represent
and should not be construed as the positions of the defendants in the litigation.
Steven Marlin practices natural resources and environmental law in Colorado as an
associate with Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP. He earned a J.D. and Masters in
Environmental Law with honors from Vermont Law School, and an LL.M. in Natural
Resources from the University of Denver College of Law, where he served on the
Water Law Review staff. Kathy Kanda is a member of the Class of 2003 at the
University of Denver College of Law. She is a staff editor of the Denver University Law
Ms. Kanda was
Review and past member of the Water Law Review staff.
Communications Director at the Colorado Department of Natural Resources from
1991-2000. She received her B.A. with distinction from the University of Colorado in
1976.
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than $125 million per year in revenue.' More people go whitewater
rafting in Colorado than in any other state.2 Recreational boating also
draws countless kayakers, canoeists, and rafters to the rivers and
streams of the state. Running the rivers of Colorado is part of
Colorado's continuing frontier heritage-essential to the state's quality
of life and vital tourism economy. Indeed, the state of Colorado is
named for the mighty river that rises here and cuts rugged canyons as
it traverses the state.
The Colorado Supreme Court addressed public use versus
exclusive private use of Colorado's waterways as long ago as 1906,
when the court held that ownership of a non-navigable streambed in
Colorado included exclusive rights to fish the water flowing over the
streambed.3 The rights of public boaters to float rivers through private
propery in Colorado came to the forefront in the state with People v.
Emmert, decided in 1979, where the court upheld the criminal trespass
conviction of a boater who stepped on the bed of a non-navigable
river.5 The court in Emmert concluded the public has no right under
the Colorado Constitution to use non-navigable waters overlying
private lands for recreational purposes without permission from the
owner of the bed.6
Because the holding in Emmert addressed criminal trespass from
recreational use of a non-navigable river, what remains unresolved in
Colorado is whether boaters who float through private property on
navigable rivers without touching the beds and banks (absent
emergency portage), are subject to civil liability for trespass. This issue
is now wending its way through the Colorado state courts. When
resolved, it will either reaffirm the public's right to float the state's
navigable rivers, or provide riparian owners with control of the waters
of Colorado's navigable rivers and streams simply because they own
the beds or banks.
Those who argue citizens are prohibited from floating certain
stretches of Colorado rivers that pass through private land do not take
into account the history and law surrounding citizen access to rivers in
this state and around the country. This article summarizes the
historical nature of such public access over waters, and discusses the
principles of federal and state constitutional, statutory, and common
law that create and protect the public's right to float waters through
private property in Colorado. First, the article explains how this public
access exists under a doctrine known as the federal navigational
servitude, which is rooted in the traditional principle that navigable
waterways cannot be privately owned. Second, the article explains the
1.

COLORADO RIVER OUTFITTERS ASSOCIATION (CROA), COMMERCIAL RIVER USE IN

1988-2001 (2002).
Id.
Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685 (Colo. 1905).
597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979).
Id.
Id. at 1027.
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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bases under Colorado statutory law for the right to float navigable
rivers in the state. Third, the article takes the reader on a journey
through the mazes of the common law doctrines of equal footing and
public trust, and describes how these doctrines provide a foundation
on which public access over navigable waters is constructed where
private ownership of the underlying streambed is asserted. Fourth, the
article explains how the right to public access to waters flowing over
privately owned beds and banks might exist, not only under the
Colorado Constitution, but also pursuant to a public trust in the state's
waters. Finally, the article demonstrates how citizens may have the
right to boat particular navigable rivers through private property in
Colorado based on other principles of real property law.
11. NAVIGABILITY
A. OVERVIEW OF NAVIGABILITY.
For waters subject to federal commerce authority, "navigability" is
the 'legal benchmark for defining the realm of public use."' In the
Daniel Ball,' decided in 1870, the Supreme Court articulated the well
established definition of navigability in the following context:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And
they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the
meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinctionfrom the navigable
waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition by
themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over
which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign
countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is
conducted by water. 9

Public rights of passage and use may be assumed for waters
designated as navigable under this definition.'0 This principle is the
core of the federal navigational servitude, a doctrine based on the
federal Commerce Clause providing the federal government with the
authority to protect and improve public navigation over such waters,
regardless of who owns the beds and banks.
This oft-cited passage from the Daniel Ball also recognizes the
7.

DAVID GETCHES, WATER LAW IN ANUTSHELL 217 (1997).

8. Steamer Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
9. Id. at 563 (emphasis added) (holding the English common law definition of
"navigability," which was limited to waters influenced by the ebbs and flows of the
tides, was inadequate for the United States in which many major water courses
essential to interstate and foreign commerce were non-tidal, inland waters).
10. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 645 (1970) (holding
navigable waterways "shall be and remain public highways ...for the public purposes
of commerce, navigation and fishery.").
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second context in which navigability may shape public use rights.
Specifically, states may develop (and, indeed, many have developed)
their own definitions of navigability for distinguishing public from
private waters for state purposes. In this regard, a waterway that is nonnavigable by federal standards may nonetheless be "public" under a
state navigability standard for determining public use rights.
Finally, a federal definition of navigability that is based on, but is
significantly more expansive than, the Daniel Ball definition
determines title to lands underlying waterways." Lands beneath waters
that are navigable under the federal test for title vested in the original
colonies before nationhood" and, in other states, upon their entry into
the Union" under the equal footing doctrine. 4 Because such waters
are navigable under a federal definition and the lands beneath them
belong to the states, logic dictates public use rights would attach.
Technically, navigability for title is a federal question.' 5 However,
because many such waters "are not adapted to, and probably will never
be used to any great extent for commercial navigation,",6 they have not
invited federal regulatory attention. Therefore, state courts have had
to interpret federal law in resolving questions concerning navigablefor-title and appurtenant public use rights for many water bodies, with
predictably uneven results. 7
Most recorded disputes have not been between federal and state
claimants. Rather, they have arisen when a riparian landowner, who
had assumed title to submerged lands within or adjacent to his or her
property, comes into conflict with a state agency or citizens'
organization claiming title in the state, often for public access and/or
environmental reasons.
In this regard, navigability for title is
frequently the threshold question for determining public use rights to
any given water body.

11. See Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding navigability for
title turns on a river's susceptibility to commerce, not whether it was actually so used);
see also discussion infra pp. 8-10.
12. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842) (holding the Duke of York held
title to tidelands in public trust for the state and, therefore, had no authority to grant
title in such property to private individuals).
13. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 196 (1987); Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1894) ("[T]he navigable waters and the soils under
them.., shall be held by the United States in trust for the future States, and shall vest
in the several States, when organized and admitted into the union."); see also Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
14. See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwatersof Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the TraditionalDoctrine, 19 ENvrL. L. 425, 444-45 (1989).
15. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926).
16. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893).
17. Compare State ex reL Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356 (Kan. 1990) (holding Shoal
Creek was non-navigable because it lacked the capacity "for valuable floatage in
transportation to market of... products;" therefore, the state did not own creek bed
and riparian landowner could fence the creek to prevent canoe passage), with
Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437, 442 (Or. 1918) ("[W]e do not see why
boating or sailing for pleasure should not be considered navigation, as well as boating
for mere pecuniary profit.").

Issue 2

THE RIGHT TO FLOAT

Unfortunately, the case law and commentary have not arrived at
consistent terms to distinguish the three types of navigability described
above. To minimize confusion, and for the purposes of this article:
"Navigable for federal purposes" or "federal navigability"
refers to whether a water body satisfies the navigability test
for federal regulation of interstate commerce, as well as the
navigability test for determining title to submerged lands,
unless otherwise specified for one or the other purpose.
"Navigable for title" refers specifically to waters for which
underlying lands passed from the federal government to the
state at statehood.
"Navigable for use," "navigable for state purposes," or "state
navigability" refers to state standards of navigability for waters
that are not navigable under any federal definition or test.
Where "navigability" stands alone, it is used in its generic sense
unless otherwise defined. Note also, the term "navigable in fact" is
avoided. The term has been used widely, but inconsistently, in both
case law and commentary. At times, the term means "navigable for
federal purposes" and, at others, it means "navigable for use," as those
terms are defined above.
B. THE NAVIGABLE SERVITUDE
1. Traditional Federal Navigational Servitude
The federal navigational servitude is a doctrine under which the
federal government protects the public right of navigation on the
nation's naturally navigable waterways, including the right of free
public passage. Under the navigational servitude, when federal action
to improve navigation damages littoral or riparian owners' interests in
navigable waters, no compensation for a taking under the Fifth and
The
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution is required."
servitude extends only to the ordinary high water mark of the
navigable waterway, and does not cover waterways that have become
navigable through private expenditures."
The federal navigational servitude originates from English
common law, which viewed navigable water as incapable of being
privately owned, giving the Crown dominion over such waters to
protect the public's right to free passage.20 The United States
Constitution incorporates this concept in the Commerce Clause,

18. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177 (1979); see also Law of Water
Rights and Resources, § 9.04 [2] [a] and [b].
19. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967); see also KaiserAetna, 444 U.S.
at 179-80.
20. Theresa D. Taylor, Determiningthe Parametersof the Navigation Servitude Doctrine,
34 VAND. L. REV.461, 463 (1981).
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giving the federal government the power to regulate activities affecting
commerce.21 The power to regulate commerce encompasses the
authority to regulate and improve navigation.
Moreover, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the power to regulate commerce
includes control of all the navigable waters of the United States for
navigational purposes, and, therefore, such navigable waters are the
"public property of the nation."2s By implication, the federal
24
navigational servitude is a component of the Commerce Clause.
Tide to lands beneath navigable waters can be held by a state as a
condition of its admission into the Union under the equal footing
doctrine, or by Indian tribes or private parties through pre-statehood
federal grants, 25 or post-statehood transfers by the state.2 The federal
government has a paramount interest in maintaining the flow of
commerce over the nation's navigable waterways, and it has the
authority to do so under the Commerce Clause. Therefore, interests
in such waters, including title to the underlying beds and banks held
by a state, an Indian tribe, or a private party, are qualified interests that
remain subject to the federal government's exercise of the
navigational servitude power. The Supreme Court has described the
nature of the federal navigational servitude and its relationship to
private interests in navigable waterways:
If the public right of navigation is the dominant right and if, as must
be the case, the tile of the owner of the bed of navigable waters holds

subject absolutely to the public right of navigation, this dominant
right must include the right to use the bed of the water for every
purpose which is in aid of navigation.
In Lewis Blue Point, the lessee of privately owned land beneath a
navigable bay located in New York state challenged a federal dredging
project that would destroy an oyster plantation located on the bay bed.
The purpose of the dredging project was to deepen the channel across
the bay to improve navigation. The owner/lessor of the bay bed
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
22. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 7 (1824).
23. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1866). The Court
similarly recognized that "great navigable stream[s]" are incapable of private
ownership. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 228 (1956); United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913).
24. See Wilkinson, supranote 14.
25. States are free to transfer public trust lands, such as the beds and banks of
navigable waters, if such a transfer is consistent with trust purposes. See Ill. Cent. R-R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455-56 (1892).
26. Transfer of title to the states under the equal footing doctrine was subject to
pre-statehood federal grants of such lands to patentees. Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9
How.) 471, 478 (1850); see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1894). Federal
authority to make pre-statehood grants of such lands that defeated a future state's
equal footing title was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Shively, and
again in Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997). But see State v.
Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1236-38 (Nev. 1972).
27. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 87 (1913).
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received title to the land through royal patents, issued prior to New
York's statehood. The Court addressed the issue of whether the
dredging project constituted a taking that required compensation."
The Court held the owner of legal title to oyster beds underlying
navigable waters in New York had no private property rights entitling
him, or his lessee, to compensation for the destruction of the oyster
plantation by a federal dredging project.2 The Court emphasized that
title to the beds of navigable waters was qualified in nature and subject
to the dominant servitude the federal government owned, which the
government could exercise for the public's benefit. This servitude
includes the right to use the privately owned beds to aid navigation."
The Court reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma." In Cherokee, the Court held that although the
Cherokee Nation received fee simple title by treaty to certain portions
of the bed of the Arkansas River in what later became the state of
Oklahoma, the federal government was not required to pay
compensation to the Indian Nation for damage to these beds by a
navigational improvement project." The Court concluded the federal
government has a dominant servitude over navigable waters, which
extends to the entire stream and streambed below the ordinary highwater mark, and the navigational servitude "applies to all holders of
riparian and riverbed interests.""
In United States v. Willow River Power Company, the Court reiterated
that riparian owners' rights in navigable streams are subject to a
dominant public interest in navigation. 4 In Willow River Power, a
company that owned the title to the bed of a navigable river sought
compensation from the United States for impairment of the
company's hydroelectric power plant, caused by a federal project that
raised the water level to improve navigation on the river. The Court,
citing United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Company, stated that private
ownership of running water in a navigable river is "inconceivable," and
concluded that the riparian owner has no right, as against
improvements of navigation, to a constant water level below the
ordinary high-water mark. Where private interests in navigable waters
conflict with the function of the government in improving navigation,
those private interests must bow to the federal government's superior
navigational right.3 5
In United States v. Twin City Power, a case based on facts similar to
those in Willow Creek, the Court described the navigational servitude as
a "dominant one which can be asserted to the exclusion of any
28. Id. at 85-86.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 88.
Id. at 87-88.
480 U.S. 700 (1987).
Id. at 700.
Id. at 704, 706.
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 507 (1945).
Id. at 509-10.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 5

The Court concluded that even
competing or conflicting one."
though the private owners of riparian land had interests in the
navigable water recognized by state law, navigable water falls under
federal domain; therefore, Congress can completely preempt, leaving
no vested private 7claims that constitute private property under the
Fifth Amendment.
Thus, through this series of cases, the Court established the
principle that private interests held in navigable waters, including title
to the underlying beds and banks, are held subject to a federal
navigational servitude. In each of these cases, the Court ruled that
exercise of a federal navigational servitude, which extinguished or
damaged private interests, relieved the federal government of the duty
to pay compensation or reduced the total amount of compensation
paid to the owner of taken riparian property.
The Court has placed limits on the federal government's exercise
of a navigational servitude, recognizing that the federal navigational
servitude does not create a blanket exception to the takings clause of
the Fifth Amendment." Kaiser-Aetna does not undermine the principle
that privately held interests in navigable waters are subject to a federal
navigational servitude. Rather, the Court in Kaiser-Aetna merely
limited the exercise of a navigational servitude, where private
expenditures transformed a non-navigable waterway into a navigable
waterway.
In this case, Kaiser Aetna leased Kuapa Pond, a privately owned
pond located in Hawaii, from the private owner in 1961. For purposes
of developing a marina on the pond, Kaiser-Aetna dredged a canal to
link the pond to Manuala Bay, a navigable bay, and to the Pacific
Ocean for boat passage. Private ownership of Kuapa Pond originated
from Hawaii's pre-statehood feudal system. The United States Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") claimed Kaiser Aetna was precluded
from denying public access to Kuapa Pond, arguing it had become a
navigable water of the United States subject to a navigable servitude as
a result of the improvements made to the pond.39
The Court held although Kuapa Pond was a navigable waterway,
the owners were not required to provide free public access to the
pond, and the Corps' exercise of a navigational servitude did not
preclude compensation to the owners. The Court noted Kuapa Pond,
which was considered private property under state law, was previously
not navigable and, therefore, incapable of being used as a highway for
navigation or commerce. Furthermore, the owners had invested a
substantial amount of money to make the pond navigable." The Court
concluded that although Kuapa Pond had become a navigable
waterway, therefore subject to regulation under the Corps' general
36. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1956).
37. Id. at 227-28.
38. Kaiser Aetnav. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 165 (1979).
39. Id. at 164.
40. Id. at 176.
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Commerce Clause powers, the Corps could not secure free 4public
access to the pond without paying compensation to the owners.
Notwithstanding this holding, the Court reaffirmed Congress'
expansive authority over the nation's navigable waters under the
Commerce Clause, indicating exercise of a federal navigational
servitude to assure the public right of navigation over interstate waters
used for commerce does not require compensation. 4 Further, the
Court noted, whatever the nature of the interests of a riparian owner
in the submerged lands bordering on a public navigational water, title
to such lands is qualified and to be held subordinate to the use of such
submerged lands and overflowing waters for public navigation at all
times.
Thus, under the traditional federal navigational servitude, the
Supreme Court has ruled that interests held in navigable waters,
especially title to beds and banks, are subordinate to the federal
government's power to regulate commerce on the nation's waterways.
The federal government's authority to exercise a navigational
servitude to protect and improve navigation on these waters is a
constitutionally based power that operates to protect the public's use
of navigable rivers for navigational purposes, regardless of ownership
status of the river's beds and banks.
2. Modern Federal Navigational Servitude
Under the traditional federal navigational servitude doctrine, the
federal government may take necessary actions to protect the
navigability of waterways and avoid paying compensation to private
parties whose property interests are adversely affected as a result of
federal actions. Therefore, as the Court held in Lewis Blue Point, Willow
River Power, and Chandler-Dunbar,the federal government may destroy
privately owned beds of navigable waters, reduce or extinguish water
power, and flood banks of fast lands if such government actions are
related to a navigational purpose.
Under a modern application of the navigational servitude, courts
have recognized the federal navigational servitude serves as the basis
for the federal government's protection of the public's right to access
over navigable waters, even where the submerged lands of such waters
are privately owned. As the Court in Kaiser Aetna observed, "[t]he
navigational servitude, which exists by virtue of the Commerce Clause
in navigable streams, gives rise to an authority in the Government to
assure that such streams retain their capacity to serve as continuous
4
highways for the purpose of navigation in interstate commerce.
Other courts have also applied the navigational servitude to permit
or protect public use of navigable waters over privately owned

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 178-79.
Id. at 175.
KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 176.
Id. at 177.
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submerged lands. For example, in Atlanta School of Kayaking Inc. v.
Douglasville-DouglasCounty Water & Sewer Authority, a county water and
sewer authority denied non-residents access to a public reservoir and
boat ramp, thus preventing use of the Dog River.4 ' The plaintiffs, a
non-resident kayaking school and private canoeing instructor, asserted
the federal navigational servitude existed in favor of all individuals,
apparently as members of the public, and created a constitutional
right of public access under the Commerce Clause.46 The court held
the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits of their
claim that the subject waterway was navigable under federal law, and
that a navigational servitude existed in the waterway to create a public
right of access, entitling them to a preliminary injunction. 7 The court
noted that "[t]he federal navigational servitude to which the plaintiffs
refer generally provides the federal government, particularly Congress,
the power to regulate navigable bodies of water by allowing it to
obstruct or modify the flow of waterways and by preventing others
from illegally obstructing or modifying those same waterways." Other
federal courts have recognized the modern federal navigational
servitude doctrine to permit public access over privately owned beds
and banks.
3. Elements of Federal Navigational Servitude
The federal navigational servitude applies only to navigable waters
that are capable of carrying interstate commerce. The Court in Kaiser
Aetna made this clear in affirming the government's authority under
the federal navigational servitude to assure that navigable waterways
"retain their capacity to serve as continuous highways for the purpose
of navigation in interstate commerce." 5° The Court stated that in
determining whether a federal action taken pursuant to a navigational
servitude constitutes a taking, "the important public interest in the
flow of interstate waters that in their natural condition are in fact
capable of supporting public navigation" must be considered'.5
45.

Atlanta Sch. of Kayaking, Inc. v. Douglasville-Douglas County Water & Sewer

Auth., 981 F. Supp. 1469 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
46.

Id. at 1472.

47. Id. at 1473-74.
48. Id. at 1472 n.6.
49. See, e.g., Dardar v. LaFourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d 824, 832 (5th Cir. 1993)
("When a navigational servitude exists, it gives rise to the right of the public to use

those waterways as 'continuous highways for the purpose of navigation in interstate
commerce'."); United States v. Harrell, 926 F.2d 1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 1991) ("If the
navigational servitude of the Tombigbee River, as a 'navigable waterbody,'
encompasses Lewis Creek, [then] Lewis Creek is public property and appellants may,
subject to state law, have a right of public access."); Goodman v. City of Crystal River,
669 F. Supp. 394, 398 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (holding Three Sisters Springs is a navigable
water of the United States and therefore subject to a federal navigational servitude).
Consequently, the plaintiff, who owned the land surrounding the Three Sisters
Springs, had no right to restrict public access by water to Three Sisters Springs except
pursuant to a Corps of Engineers permit. Id.

50. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 177.
51.

Id. at 175.
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Although the federal navigational servitude derives from the
Commerce Clause, the question whether the general federal
regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause, including a federal
navigational servitude, extends to a particular waterway, depends on
whether the waterway is deemed navigable under the basic federal
navigability test articulated in the Daniel Ball case. Courts have
extended the general authority to regulate waterways under the
commerce clause to control waters that are in fact presently navigable,
non-navigable tributaries, waters that were once navigable but no
longer so, and waters neither formerly nor presently navigable but that
can be made navigable by reasonable improvements."
The Court in KaiserAetna, however, explained that navigability of a
waterway for purposes of extending: (1) the power to regulate
navigation under the Commerce Clause; (2) the authority of the Corps
under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899;"' or (3)
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, is broader than navigability for
purposes of a navigational servitude. The Court acknowledged that for
purposes of extending the Corps' power to regulate commerce, Kuapa
Pond is navigable water. However, this conclusion does not mean the
pond is subject to a navigational servitude:
It is true that Kuapa Pond may fit within definitions of "navigability"
articulated in past decisions of this Court. But it must be recognized

that the concept of navigability in these decisions was used for

purposes other than to delimit the boundaries of the navigational
servitude: for example, to define the scope of Congress' regulatory

authority under

the Interstate

Commerce Clause

[citing

to

Appalachian Power and the Daniel Ball], to determine the extent of

authority of the Corps of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors

Appropriation Act of 1899 [citing United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,

362 U.S. 482 (1960)1, and to establish limits of the jurisdiction of the
federal courts conferred by Art. III, § 2, of the United States
Constitution over admiralty and maritime cases.... Thus, while
Kuapa Pond may be subject to regulation by the Corps of Engineers,
acting under the authority delegated it by Congress in the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act, it does
not follow that the pond is also
4
subject to a public right of access.5

As the Court in Kaiser Aetna explained, the navigational servitude
52. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). The
Supreme Court recently signaled the start of a possible trend towards reducing the
scope of navigability for purposes of the Corps' regulatory authority in Solid Waste
Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). The Court held that

isolated intrastate wetlands were not navigable waters for purposes of the Corps'
regulatory authority under the Clean Water Act, narrowing this authority to waters that
tend to fall more within the classical definition of "navigable" waters by having some
hydrological connection to navigable waters. This case, however, is not applicable for
purposes of determining whether a federal navigational servitude applies to a

waterbody, as the holding turned on the agency's interpretation of a specific statutory

provision.
53. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994).
54. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 171-73.
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involves "the important public interest in the flow of interstate waters
that in their natural condition are in fact capable of supporting public
navigation.""5 The court in Dardarv. LaFourcheRealty stated, "[w]aters
so encumbered are subject to public use as 'continuous highways for
the purpose of navigation in interstate commerce'." 6 Thus, waterways
subject to a navigational servitude must meet the federal test of
navigability and cannot become navigable for federal navigational
servitude purposes through improvements, even though such
waterways are subject to regulatory authority under the Commerce
Clause or statute. Therefore, the scope of navigability for a servitude is
narrower than the scope of navigability for regulating commerce in
general.
A waterway deemed navigable for federal purposes must be
capable of carrying interstate commerce, which courts have defined
broadly." In Wickard v. Fillburn, the Court addressed the regulation of
commerce in general, noting:
[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if
it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and
this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier
time have been defined as "direct" or "indirect."

The interstate commerce element of the federal navigable
servitude derives from the definition 59of "navigable waters of the
United States" set forth in the DanielBall.

The Court in Kaiser Aetna, at least for purposes of regulation of
55. Id. at 175 (citing United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917)). The court in Cress
held the servitude applies to rivers that are navigable in fact in their natural condition.
In discussing the concept of navigable in fact, the court cited the reasoning in the
Montello. Montello, 87 U.S. 430 (1874).
The capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation and
commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river, rather than
the extent and manner of that use. If it be capable in its natural state of
being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what mode the
commerce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes in law a
public river or highway.
Id. at 441-42.
56. Dardar v. LaFourche Realty Co., 55 F.3d 1082, 1084 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979)).
57. See 4 WATES AND WATER RIGHTS § 30.05 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1996) ("The
[servitude navigability test]-presumably reflecting the historic, if puzzling, commerce
clause association-demands susceptibility to use for navigation in interstate
commerce.") (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
58. Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
59. Steamer Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning
of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the
States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by
uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or
may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary
modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.
Id. at 563.
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commerce in general, noted that "a wide spectrum of economic
activities 'affect' interstate commerce and thus are susceptible of
congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause."0 The Court
reasoned Congress, therefore, could prescribe rules to regulate
running lights on boats, to remove obstructions to navigation, and for
any other reasons that further navigation or commerce. The opinion,
however, suggests that to satisfy the interstate commerce element of
the navigational servitude, the waterway, in its natural state, must be
physically capable of transporting interstate commerce, i.e., floating
vessels.
The lower district court in KaiserAetna concluded that Kuapa Pond
was used for interstate commerce because Kaiser Aetna, the lessee,
used the pond to raise revenue and to transport both residents and
non-residents in and out of the attached bay.6" The Ninth Circuit
ruled Kuapa Pond was transformed into a navigable water of the
United States, subject to a federal navigational servitude even though
it was privately owned and had never been used for interstate
commerce purposes.6 3 The Supreme Court, however, did not address
the "effect" of the pond on interstate commerce. Instead, the court
seemed to focus on whether interstate commerce could, in fact, be
conducted on the waters of the pond:
It is clear that prior to its improvement, Kuapa Pond was incapable of
being used as a continuous highway for the purpose of navigation in
interstate commerce. Its maximum depth at high tide was a mere two
feet, it was separated from the adjacent bay and ocean by a natural
barrier beach, and its principal commercial value was limited to
fishing. It consequently is not the sort of "great navigable stream"
that this Court haspreviously recognized as being "' [incapable] of
private ownership'."
The Supreme Court noted that before the private improvements,
while Kuapa Pond was still a fishpond, fishermen operated a few flatbottomed boats on the pond, but no evidence existed that these boats
could acquire access to the adjacent bay and ocean from the pond. As
such, Kuapa Pond "clearly was not navigable in fact in its natural state,"
apparently because of the lack of physical links to other navigable
waters, i.e., the open ocean.65
In Boone v. United States,6 the Ninth Circuit reached a similar
conclusion based on the ruling in Kaiser Aetna. In Boone, the owner of
a man-made lagoon in Hawaii, formed from a littoral fishpond and

60. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 174.
61. See generally id.
62. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 53-54 (D. Haw. 1976).
63. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 584 F.2d 378, 378-79 (9th Cir. 1978).
64. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 178-79 (citing United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co.,
229 U.S. 53,69 (1913)).
65. Id.at 179 n.10.
66. 944 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1991).
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separated from open ocean, brought an action against the Corps to
secure the right to deny public access to the lagoon." Similar to the
facts in KaiserAetna, the lagoon owner expended private funds to make
the lagoon navigable, and the Corps subsequently claimed the lagoon
was subject to a naviational servitude; therefore, it was open to the
public for free access.
The court drew a direct analogy to Kaiser Aetna, holding that
although the pond was navigable for purposes of regulation by the
Corps under the Commerce Clause, it was not subject to a navigational
servitude because the fishpond was "incapable of use as a continuous
highway for purpose of navigation in interstate commerce."69 The
court also noted that although the maximum depth of the pond was
three feet, the pond was separated from open ocean by the artificial
barrier, and there was little evidence in the record of any commercial
use of the pond since 1957. 70
The court indicated that the possible prior navigability of the area
comprising the lagoon in its natural state, although insufficient to
impose a navigational servitude, was a relevant factual consideration in
determining whether a navigational servitude applied. Although the
pond may have been navigable prior to construction of the stonewall,
the lagoon was not the sort of "great navigable stream" susceptible to a
navigational servitude.7'
Other courts have also struggled in determining whether a
waterway meets the interstate commerce element of the federal
navigational servitude doctrine. For example, in Loving v. Alexander,
riparian owners sought a declaration that the Jackson River was nonnavigable, and requested an injunction to bar public access over the
river. The Corps claimed regulatory jurisdiction over the river under
section 10 of the River and Harbors Act of 1899. 73
The Jackson River is relatively narrow, crooked, rocky, and shallow,
with depths ranging from ten inches to six feet and a width of
approximately forty to one hundred feet wide. Although the river is
located entirely within the state of Virginia, it joins with the
Cowpasture River to form the James River, which ultimately flows into
the Chesapeake Bay.74 The court held the evidence introduced at trial
was sufficient to show the river was historically used as a highway for
useful commerce, especially by lumber companies floating logs to
sawmills. The court also noted that even though the river in its
present condition could not support commercial log floating, it was

67. Id. at 1489.
68. See generally id.
69. Id. at 1501.
70. Id. at 1501-02.
71. Id. at 1502.
72. Loving v. Alexander, 548 F. Supp. 1079 (W.D. Va. 1982), affd, 745 F.2d 861
(4th Cir. 1984).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994).
74. Loving, 548 F. Supp. at 1084.
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susceptible to use for recreational canoeing and cold-water fishing.75
The court concluded that although the river was navigable,
therefore susceptible to regulation under the Commerce Clause, it was
nonetheless exempt from the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction. The
court found that under section 10 of the River and Harbors Act of
1899, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 59(1), bodies of water located entirely
within one state, and considered navigable solely on the basis of
historical use in interstate
commerce, are exempt from section 10's
6
permit requirements.
Notwithstanding this holding, the court proceeded to rule that the
Jackson River was subject to a navigational servitude, and therefore the
Corps could guarantee free public access over the river without paying
compensation to the riparian owners." In addressing the interstate
commerce element of navigability for purposes of a navigational
servitude, the court noted that as a navigable water of the United
States, the Jackson River was subject to the exercise of federal authority
because future recreational use by out-of-state visitors of a proposed
federal fishery would affect interstate commerce.78
The court
concluded that under these circumstances, a federal navigational
servitude would traditionally apply to the river. 9
The court then considered whether a navigational servitude would
apply in light of the holding and reasoning in Kaiser Aetna.0 In
distinguishing Kaiser Aetna, the court concluded that although the bed
of Jackson River was considered privately owned under Virginia law,
unlike the pond in Kaiser Aetna, it was not previously a non-navigable
waterway made navigable by private expenditures.
Rather, the
evidence showed the Jackson River was historically navigable in its
natural state, as manifested by past use of the river to float railroad ties,
lumber, and furs."1
In Atlanta School of Kayaking,2 the court granted a preliminary
injunction to the plaintiff recreational floaters, permitting them to use
a navigable reservoir and access ramp linked to the Dog River. 3 The
court stated that when considering whether a body of water is a
navigable waterway to which individuals have a right of access, a court
must first ascertain whether the waterbody is navigable in fact, and
75. Id. at 1085.
76. Id. at 1090.
77. Id. (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
78. Id. at 1090-91 (citing United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979)). In
Byrd, the court held, based on Wickard v. Fillburn,that a landowner's filling of wetlands,
though local, had the potential for exerting substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce because out-of-state visitors used the lake affected by the filling activities for
recreation. Id. at 1209-10. The case, however, did not involve a federal navigational
servitude, and it was decided approximately two months before the Kaiser Aetna
decision.
79. Loving, 548 F. Supp. at 1091.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 1089, 1091.
981 F. Supp. 1469 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
Id. at 1470, 1475.
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then determine whether a "navigational servitude exists creating a
public right of access." 4 A waterway is navigable in fact "if it is used or
susceptible of being used in its ordinary condition to transport
[interstate] commerce."" The court concluded that the plaintiffs had
a substantial likelihood of success on a finding that the Dog River was
navigable in fact because it was susceptible of being used as a highway
for commerce at statehood. 8
The court noted that while there was then little use of the Dog
River as a major source of interstate commerce, "'the presence of
recreational craft may indicate that a water body is capable of bearing
some forms of commerce, either presently, in the future, or at a past
point in time,"' to support a finding of navigability."
The court
concluded that the plaintiffs could show the waterway was navigable
because kayaks and canoes could travel down the Dog River, and
students paid to float down the river.8 " The court addressed the
interstate commerce requirement by pointing out that the fact that the
Dog River was entirely within the state of Georgia did not make it
incapable of carrying interstate commerce, pursuant to 33 C.F.R. §
329.7.9

In Dardarv. LaFourcheRealty Co.,9° the owners of a series of canals in
Louisiana constructed levees and gates limiting public access through
the canals.91 Commercial fisherman and the state of Louisiana
brought suit claiming a federal navigational servitude applied to the
waterways, providing a right of public access. Based on the reasoning
in KaiserAetna, the Fifth Circuit held that a navigational servitude did

84. Id. at 1472 (citing United States v. Harrell, 926 F.2d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir.
1991)).
85. Id. at 1472-73 (internal quotations omitted). 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (2001) provides
that "[n]avigable waters of the United States are those waters that are subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or
may be susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign commerce."
86. Atlanta Sch. of Kayaking, Inc. v. Douglasville-Douglas County Water & Sewer
Auth., 981 F. Supp. 1469, 1473 n.8 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (citing the Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)).
87. Id. at 1473 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 329.6(a)).
88. Id. at 1473-74.
89. Id. at 1473 n.11. 33 C.F.R. § 329.1 addresses the required interstate nature of
"navigable waters of the United States" for purposes of the Corps of Engineers'
regulatory authority. 33 C.F.R. § 329.7 provides that:
[a] waterbody may be entirely within a state, yet still be capable of carrying
interstate commerce. This is especially clear when it physically connects with
a generally acknowledged avenue of interstate commerce, such as the ocean
or one of the Great Lakes, and is yet wholly within one state. Nor is it
necessary that there be a physically navigable connection across a state
boundary. Where a waterbody extends through one or more states, but
substantial portions, which are capable of bearing interstate commerce, are
located in only one of the states, the entirety of the waterway up to the head
(upper limit) of navigation is subject to Federal jurisdiction.
Id.
90. 55 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir. 1995).
91. Id. at 1083.
92. Id. at 1083-84.
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not apply to the canals because evidence presented at trial showed that
the waterways could not, in their natural state, serve as "highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in
customary modes."93 Specifically, photographic and cartographic
exhibits and testimony showed that the waterways were too shallow
(eighteen inches and seven inches in some places) and discontinuous
in nature for passage, were isolated and/or were connected to outlying
bodies of water only by man-made ditches dug with private
expenditures, thus becoming passable only by private dredging. The
court held that the waterways were not navigable in fact.95
The court further reasoned that even if the waterways were
navigable, a federal navigational servitude would not exist because due
to "the shallow depth and discontinuous nature" of the canals, they
could not be considered "akin to the 'sort of great navigable stream
that ... has [been] previously recognized as being incapable of private
ownership'." 96 Moreover, the canals could serve as highways of
commerce only after private dredging efforts.(" Thus, similar to the
court in Kaiser Aetna, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the fact that the
canals were incapable, in their natural state, of transporting interstate
98
commerce.
The capability of a waterway to carry interstate commerce in its
natural state, including the waterway's unimpeded connection to open
waters, which themselves are capable of carrying commerce, was one
factor the Court in Kaiser Aetna applied to determine whether a
navigational servitude existed. The expenditure of private funds to
make the water susceptible of carrying commerce, as well as traditional
Hawaiian law that designated the pond as private property, were the
other primary factors that the Court emphasized in reaching its
conclusion. The Supreme Court in Kaiser Aetna never explicitly
rejected the lower district court's conclusion that use of the pond by
out-of-state boaters made the pond susceptible to interstate commerce.
This conclusion by the lower court, and the similar reasoning by the
court in Loving, focused on the "substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce" principle from Wickard v. Fillburn to determine
whether a waterway is susceptible to use in interstate commerce.
Moreover, the court in Atlanta School of Kayaking made it clear that an
isolated waterway is capable of carrying interstate commerce for
purposes of applying a federal navigational servitude.
As the series of cases discussed above underscore, a federal
navigational servitude exists on navigable waters of the United States.
That is, a water that, in its ordinary condition, by itself or uniting with

93.

Id. at 1084-86 (citing the Daniel Ball, 77 U.S (10 Wall.) 557, 563(1870)).

94. Id. at 1085-86.
95. Id. at 1085.
96. Dardar,55 F.3d at 1086 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-

79 (1979)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1085-86.
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other waters, is used as a continuous highway for the purpose of
navigation in interstate commerce. In many cases, the Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") has designated a waterway a "navigable water of
the United States" in accordance with the agency's definition of
navigable waters of the United States contained in 33 C.F.R. § 329.4.
For instance, the Corps' Sacramento District office" has specifically
designated Navajo Reservoir and the thirty-nine mile length of the
Colorado River from Grand Junction to the Utah-Colorado border as
"navigable waters of the Unites States" within the district's regulatory
boundaries'
The Corps acknowledges that "[p]recise definitions of 'navigable
waters of the United States' or 'navigability' are ultimately dependent
on judicial interpretation and cannot be made conclusively by
administrative agencies," although the policies and criteria contained
in the Corps' regulation "are in close conformance with the tests used
by Federal courts.""0 ' The Corps' regulations also note that "the lists
[of waters determined navigable waters of the United States] represent
only those waterbodies for which determinations have been made;
absence from that list should not be taken as an indication that the
waterbody is not navigable."' 2 Thus, the lower Colorado River and
Navajo Reservoir are not necessarily the only "navigable waters of the
United States" that exist in the state of Colorado.
In the absence of specific Corps designation, evidence of a river's
ability to transport interstate commerce now and in the past will
support the interstate commerce element of a navigational servitude.
Such evidence could show that the river, in its natural condition, was
historically used for transportation of commerce such as floating logs
or other commercial products and that it is presently being used for
commercial purposes, including commercial and recreational boating.
As an example, one Colorado court has ruled that based on historical
use by boats and rafts, the Gunnison River from Almont downstream
to Cimarron is a navigable stream and the waters therein public
waters.' 5 In addition, evidence showing that out-of-state visitors use a
river for recreational purposes also indicates that the river is used for
interstate commerce purposes, as the Fourth Circuit in Loving, the
Seventh Circuit in Byrd, and the district court in Kaiser Aetna all
concluded, therefore making the river navigable for federal
99. The Corps' jurisdiction over Colorado's watersheds is divided among four
different districts, with the Sacramento District overseeing the western slope
watersheds, and the Albuquerque, Omaha, and Kansas City districts overseeing the
state's eastern watersheds.
100. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Sacramento District, Waterways within
Sacramento District Regulatory Boundaries, at www.spk.usace.army.mil/cespkco/regulatory/navigable.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2002).
101. 33 C.F.R. § 329.3 (2001); see also id. § 329.14 ("Although conclusive

determinations of navigability can be made only by federal Courts, those made by
federal agencies are nevertheless accorded substantial weight by the courts.").

102. Id. § 329.16(b).
103. Arnett v. Trouthaven, Inc., No. 5702 (Gunnison County Dist. Ct., Sept. 13,
1961) (on file Gunnison County Dist. Ct.).
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navigational servitude purposes.
III. STATUTORY BASIS FOR RIGHT TO FLOAT IN COLORADO
Two statutory provisions, Colorado Revised Statutes sections 18-9107(1) (a) and 18-4-504.5 respectively, support the concept of a public
right to float the navigable rivers and streams of the state of Colorado,
either independently or in conjunction with other legal principles. l 4
Under section 18-9-107(1) (a), it is a misdemeanor to obstruct a
waterway "to which the public or a substantial group of the public has
access. "
This provision indicates that the legislature intended to
keep Colorado's waterways open to boaters and free of dangerous
obstructions. There are no reported cases interpreting or applying
this law.
Private landowners would argue that the public has no access to
the segment of any Colorado waterway that flows through their land.
In a typical situation, however, the public accesses a river by starting a
trip at a recognized boat ramp or "put-in" on public land and ending
at a similarly designated boat ramp or "take-out" spot downstream.
Many such trips are made subject to permits or regulations issued by
the public land management agencies that own and regulate use of the
put-ins and take-outs, with the understanding that the float trip will
pass through private land at some point in the floatable stretch.
Under such a scenario, the public has legal access to the river, and the
question remains whether, consistent with section 18-9-107(1) (a), a
private landowner may deny all use of the floatable stretch. In an
analogous situation, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the right to
float against a trespass claim:
We are of the opinion and hold that the river in question is navigable
in fact and that plaintiff owns the land to the middle of the stream
but that the water is in the nature of a street or highway so that
eople who get on the river without committing an act of trespass has

ic] the right to boat on either side of the middle of the stream,

either up or down stream.

The second statutory provision relevant to the right to float is
section 18-4-504.5.1°7 In 1977, while the Emmert case was pending, the
General Assembly amended Article 4 of Title 18, "Offenses Against
Property," by adding section 18-4-504.5, which defined the term
"premises" so that boating on a non-navigable stream was not a
trespass.'
More specifically, the definition of premises refers to "real
property, buildings, and other improvements thereon, and the stream
104.

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-9-107(1)(a), 18-4-504.5 (2001).

105. Id. § 18-9-107 (1)(a), (3).
106.

Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 936 (Okla. 1969).

107. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-504.5 (2001).
108. Id.; Hearing on Second Reading of Senate Bill 360 Before the Senate, 51st Gen.
Assembly, First Regular Sess. (Colo. 1977) [hereinafter Hearing on Second Reading]
(unpublished Transcript on file with Author).
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banks and beds of any non-navigable fresh water streams flowing
4
through such real property."O
A review of the legislative record
reveals the legislature deliberately amended the trespass statute in
order to approve of floating through private property." The mention
of banks and beds, but not the mention of "water" or "channel," was
intentional. The result is that boating a river is not a trespass under
the statute, so long as the boaters stay in their boats and do not get out
onto the real property.
During the Senate Committee Hearing on Senate Bill 360, which
became section 18-4-504.5, the "intent" expressed by Senator Soash
was "to make sure ... they stay on the water, don't get out and roam
around and interfere with these people's property." " With this, the
Senate addressed the problem with people getting out of their boats
and causing trouble on adjacent private land, and not with people
staying in their boats." 2 The problem perceived by many senators
regarding an earlier version of the bill, however, was with the meaning
of the term "channels" and whether that would result in a trespass for
boaters who stayed on the water." Several senators expressed concern
that this draft of the bill might impair long-standing kayak and raft
races, and other existing boating uses."' Likewise, Senator Cooper
expressed the need to represent people who use streams for tubing
and the like." 5 These comments reflected the Senate's desire to
maintain the existing public boating uses unhindered.
At the Second Reading of Senate Bill 360 before a full Senate on
March 31, 1977, Senate sponsor, Senator Kinnie offered a floor
amendment to "strike channels and substitute stream banks."11 6 He
proposed this amendment to address the concern by some that
"channels ... might mean water of these streams."'1 7 The Senate
subsequently struck the language to ensure "no inference to the
water.""'
More importantly, Senator Kinnie stated that the bill
protected landowners, but "will not stop tubing, canoeing, or boating

109. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-4-504.5 (2001).
110. See generally Hearing on Senate Bill 360 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 51st Gen
Assembly, First Regular Sess. (Colo. 1977) [hereinafter Senate Hearing on 360]
(unpublished Transcript on file with Author); Hearing on Second Reading, supra note
108.
111. Senate Hearingon 360, supra note 110, at 8 (statement of Sen. Soash).
112. See, e.g., id. at 16, 19-20, 22-25, 29. By way of examples: "when you are talking
about trespass on the bank, that's one thing; and trespass certainly on the buildings
and that sort of thing, you bet... [b]ut that's quite different than the bed and
stream." Id. at 22 (statement of Sen. Cooper); "[I]f the guy was riding on the water
and wasn't on the bed of the stream, then he wouldn't be in violation of the law." Id. at
25; "They wouldn't bother.., if you stay in your boat." Id. at 20; "It's the.., ones that
get out and get on your land." Id.
113. Id. at 23-26.
114. Id. at 18-19, 21, 26.
115. Id. at 25.
116. Hearingon Second Reading, supra note 108, at 2.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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on the water."" 9 In other words, the bill essentially ensured that those
existing uses could continue. Senator Kinnie repeated himself later by
noting "[i]f they want to canoe or tube or stay on the water, not bother
the properties, why there would be no problem." 2 °
The revised bill then went to the House Judiciary Committee on
April 15, 1977. The revision was explained as necessary because one
could misconstrue the term "channels" to mean water, and "we are not
talking about the water, we are talking about the stream beds, the real
property.' 2' A representative informed the House Committee that the
amended bill "is not to interfere with [a boater's] right to go down the
creek or the river." 22 The following testimony also supports that
intent:
[P]eople said that they could use the streams in the state-I don't
think there's any question about that-for people boating down, to
fish in the streams, but what people were doing was running jeeps
down the middle of the streams claiming that this is all public
property 23and they had the right to use it. That's the intent behind

this Bill.1

The changes to the bill were further explained as necessary because
the earlier version of the bill may have "prevent[ed] people from...
floating the boats down the stream, and there was never any intent to
prevent that in the Bill, and that was pointed out; that's what resulted
in the change
to stream banks to make that clear, that didn't include
24
water."
Did the legislature act with the stated intent to ensure the longstanding right to boat a river without interference, while still intending
that the very same right be impossible to exercise by allowing civil
lawsuits for damages against boaters? Further, did the legislature act
to ensure that boating was possiblewhile at the same time make boating
impossible by subjecting boaters to liability and injunction for civil
trespass? Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the legislature's
expressed intent. Transcripts of the debates in both the House and
the Senate demonstrate that the legislature was consciously trying to
protect the interests of floaters as well as adjacent landowners.
Additionally, the transcripts show that the legislature thought it was
doing so in passing subsection 504.5, the effect of which was to allow
floaters to pass through private land so long as they did not touch the
bed or banks as they floated through.
The definition of premises in the criminal code is both the clearest
119. Id. at 3.
120. Id. at 4.
121. Hearing Before the House Judiciay Comm. on Senate Bill 360, 51st Gen. Assembly,
First Regular Sess. 3 (Colo. 1977) [hereinafter House Hearing on 360] (unpublished
transcript on file with Author).
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 4 (statement of Mr. McLain).
124. Id. at 6-7.
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and the only statement by the legislature on whether boating through
private property is a trespass. Neither common law nor case law
defines "premises" for purposes of the alleged civil trespass for
floating; therefore, it is appropriate to rely upon the criminal code to
provide the definition. The legislative history supports this assertion,
illustrating that when the legislature defined "premises," it intended to
speak broadly to the right to boat rivers free from trespass liability.
People v. Emmert2 ' does not alter the above conclusions. The
legislature enacted subsection 504.5 prior to the Emmert decision. The
trespass statute at issue in Emmert was the version in effect before the
legislature acted in 1977.26

The Supreme Court referred only in

passing to the 19777 amendment and noted that the legislature had
"clarified" the law.
Because the definition of "premises" was not at
issue in Emmert, the Court did not interpret or apply the new statutory
definition. The present statute addressing trespass contains the best
and clearest statement by the legislature on whether boating is a
trespass.
Colorado Attorney General Duane Woodard reached much the
same conclusion in 1983, when he issued a formal opinion ("Woodard
Opinion") interpreting the impact of the statutory trespass
amendment.12 8 The Woodard Opinion answered two key questions:
(1) are boaters subject to criminal prosecution if they float across
private lands without touching the riverbed or banks? (2) Does the
law of trespass, which defines "premises" to exclude the stream channel,
authorize private property owners to prohibit boating?'29 The Attorney
"3
General concluded that the answer to both questions was "no. 0 0
Consistent with the legislative statements of purpose, the Woodard
Opinion indicates that the legislature modified the common law.
Specifically, the Woodard Opinion notes that the Emmert discussion of
the "ad coelum" doctrine was "arguably dictum." 31

Even assuming the

"ad coelum" doctrine was not dictum, however, the Woodard Opinion
noted that the legislature has authority to modify the common law
and, based upon the new definition of "premises," concluded that the
"ad coelum" doctrine was necessarily repealed in the criminal trespass

125. 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979).
126. Id. at 1026 (applying the 1973 Colorado Revised Statutes section 18-4-504,
which did not include a definition of "premises" until the General Assembly added
subsection 504.5 in 1977). Subsection 18-4-504 simply stated, "A person commits the
crime of third degree criminal trespass if he unlawfully enters or remains in or upon
premises. Third degree criminal trespass is a class 1 petty offense." COLO. REV. STAT. §
18-4-504 (1973).
127. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1029-30.
128. Purpose and Effect of C.R.S. 1973, 18-4-504.5 (1978 repl. vol. 8), 1983 Colo. AG
LEXIS 42, at 1 (1983) [hereinafter Woodard Opinion].
129. Id. As discussed in greater detail supra, Colorado law makes it a crime for any
person to obstruct passage on a waterway to which the public has access. See also COLO.
REv. STAT. § 18-9-107 (2001).
130. Woodard Opinion, supra note 128, at 1-2.
131. Id. at 4.
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context. 32 The Woodard Opinion squared this finding with the clear
legislative intent and ultimately
found that a private property owner
3
cannot prohibit boating.

lV. THE EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE AND THE PUBLIC
TRUST IN THE STATE'S STREAMBEDS
Another legal basis for the public's right to float is the state's
property interest in lands underlying navigable waters as provided by
the Equal Footing Doctrine. Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, when
a state entered the Union, the federal government granted it title to
lands beneath navigable watercourses within its boundaries.14 The
foundation for the modern Public Trust Doctrine is the well-settled
principle that such lands belong to the states. The Public Trust
Doctrine imposes upon the states a responsibility to manage these
lands consistent with public trust interests."'
Whether a watercourse is navigable for purposes of determining
title to its streambeds is a federal question.
The "starting point in
determining navigability for resolving title" 137 is the test the United

States Supreme Court set forth in the Daniel Ball, and discussed in
section II above.
In applying this test, which originally developed in
the context of determining congressional authority to regulate
navigation under its Commerce Clause authority,19 the courts have
interpreted its provisions expansively in the title test context.
For example, in Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held
navigability for title turned on a river's susceptibility to commerce, not
actual use.4 Ahtna, Inc. involved a title dispute in which the state of
Alaska successfully challenged the Bureau of Land Management's
conveyance of lands beneath the Gulkana River to a Native American
corporation under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.14 ' The
stream segment at issue was on average three feet deep and frozen
132. Id. at 5-8.
133. Id. at 10-14. Although the Woodard Opinion primarily addresses the criminal
trespass issue, it does state, for example, "[t]hat statute [18-4-504.5] therefore, does
not authorize either law enforcement officials or the owners of stream beds or of
adjoining property to prohibit such activities." Id. at 13-14. Also, "[b]ecause section
18-4-504.5 speaks to criminal trespass and does not address civil remedies, it cannot be
viewed as authorizing the owners of stream banks and beds to prohibit or otherwise
control the use for floating of waters passing over their lands." Id. at 14.

134. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845); Martin v. Waddell,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842); see also Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis
Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
See generally Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwatersof the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the TraditionalDoctrine, 19 ENVrL. L. 425, 439-48 (1989)).
135. Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
136. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926).
137. Alaska v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 1223, 1226 (D. D. Alaska 1983).
138. Steamer Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1970).
139. See discussion supra Part II.
140. Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1989).

141.

Id. at 1402-03.

WATER LAWREVEW

Volume 5

seven months of the year.'
Most of the river's use was recreational;
including guided fishing and sightseeing trips beginning in the
1970s.11 The court observed that the aluminum powerboats and rafts
customarily used for such trips exceeded the 1,000-pound capacity of
watercraft used by hunters and anglers on the river during the 1940s
and 1950s before statehood.'4 4 Accordingly, the court found the
watercraft customarily used at statehood could have "at least supported
commercial activity of the type carried on today, with minor
modifications due to a more limited load capacity and rudimentary
technology." 4 5 In so holding, the court rejected the argument that
recreational industry activity did not
4 6 constitute commerce as "too
narrow a view of commercial activity."
As a result of Ahtna and other case law, the modern definition of
navigability for title places primary emphasis on whether the "natural
conditions" of a stream at statehood were "susceptible to commerce,
rather than whether the stream was actually used for commerce. "",
Because many such waters "are not adapted to, and probably will never
be used to any great extent for commercial navigation,"" they have
not invited federal regulatory attention.
Therefore, questions
concerning navigability for title and any appurtenant public use rights
for many water bodies have required state courts to interpret federal
law, with predictably uneven results.'49
In 1912, the Colorado Supreme Court declared in dictum that
"[t] he natural streams of this state are, in fact, non-navigable within its
territorial limits."5 0 This declaration, presumably, has given rise to the

142. Id. at 1402.
143. Id. at 1403.
144. Id. at 1403, 1405.
145. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d at 1405.
146. Id.
147. Id.; see also A. DAN TARLOGK, LAw OF WATER RiGHTs AND RESOURCES § 8:12 (Supp.
2001) (citing United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283
U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926)).
148. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893).
149. See, e.g., State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231,1236 (Nev. 1972) ("No case has been
found which holds that there is exclusive federal jurisdiction to determine title
navigability.... [TJhe uniform federal 'test' ... has been applied by both state and
federal courts to determine title to submerged lands."). CompareKansas ex rel. Meek. v.
Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Kan. 1990) (holding Shoal Creek was non-navigable
because it lacked the capacity "for valuable floatage in transportation to market of
products," therefore, the state did not own the creek bed and its riparian landowner
could fence the creek to prevent canoe passage), with Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143 (" [W]e
do not see why boating or sailing for pleasure should not be considered navigation, as
well as boating for mere pecuniary profit."). See also Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at 1234
(holding that because the Carson River had historically been used for floating timber,
it satisfied the federal test for navigability for title, after noting other states had
"adopted varying and less stringent tests... in order to establish the right of public
use.").
150. Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 16-17 (Colo. 1982) and Denver
Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 535 P.2d 200, 204 (Colo. 1975);
accord In re German Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2, 9 (Colo. 1913) ("The natural
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widespread assumption that, because Colorado's watercourses are nonnavigable, the state has never acquired an ownership interest in its
streambeds."' Left unchallenged, this assumption suggests that unless
a stream flows through public property, its streambed is presumptively
privately owned.
At least one jurisdiction has declared, however, that a state has an
obligation to make particularized assessments of the navigability of its
watercourses before it can disclaim its equal footing interest to the
beds beneath them. In Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, the Arizona Court
of Appeals held that the state could not disclaim or relinquish its
putative title to streambeds without first determining their navigability
under the federal test for determining streambed ownership.
The
court based its determination, in part, on leading United States
Supreme Court decisions that "made it clear that the states owe a
fiduciary obligation to the general public" regarding management of
"sovereign resources" including "public trust" lands underlying
navigable waters."' As authority for requiring the Daniel Ball test to
determine navigability for title, the court cited the "constitutional
nature of the equal footing doctrine, 5 ' the indisputably federal basis
for the navigability for title definition"'5 and state courts'
"'constitutional obligation' . . . to uphold federal law."5 7
At issue were legislative efforts beginning in the late 1980s to
relinquish Arizona's interest in its watercourse bedlands after state
officials began asserting state ownership rights to streambeds beneath
navigable waters. 1'
Arizona, like Colorado, historically had not
asserted claims to such streambeds"' Until 1985, Arizona did not
assert equal footing claims in any watercourse except for the Colorado

streams of the state are non-navigable within its limits.").

151.

2

GEORGE VRANESH, COLORADO WATER LAW

§ 6.9 n.454 (Margaret Nagel Dillon

ed., 1987) ("It is generally assumed that Colorado's streams are non-navigable for
purposes of bed title.").
152. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 729 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)
(invalidating a statute that would have allowed the state to disclaim its ownership of
streambeds under a definition of navigability more restrictive than the federal
definition of navigability for title).

153. Id.
154. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988)).
155. Id. at 731 n.l1; see Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.
429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977); see also 4 WATERAND WATERRIGHTS, supranote 57, § 30.01 (a)
(citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566-67 (1911) ("[tlhe equal footing doctrine is
treated by the Supreme Court as a federal constitutional dimension.")).
156. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 731 (internal citation omitted).
157. Id. (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980)).
158. Id. at 727.
159. Id. at 726. Though the state had allowed its right of ownership to lie "dormant"
for more than seventy years, the court noted such dormancy did not invalidate the
state's claims, because "[n) either doctrines of laches nor statutes of limitations [could]
defeat the state's sovereign title to trust lands." Id. at 726 n.1 (citing State ex rel. Bd. of
Univ. & Sch. Lands v. Andrus, 506 F. Supp. 619, 625 (D. N.D. 1981) rev'd on other
groundsby Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273 (1983)
(internal quotations omitted)).
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River.'60 Predictably, Arizona officials' state ownership claims "upset
longstanding assumptions about title to riverbed lands" 6' and
"clouded the title held by political subdivisions, private individuals,
and corporations that had for years exercised control over, made
improvements to, and paid taxes upon these affected stretches of
land." 61 In 1987, the Arizona Legislature, concerned about "economic
displacement," enacted a statue ("1987 Act") designed to resolve the
state's claims without "lengthy, difficult and expensive fact-finding,"
while recognizing titleholders' "accrued equity in taxes, improvements
and family and social ties."16 The 1987 Act intended to confirm titles
held by private parties and political subdivisions in the beds of waters
other than the Colorado River, while compensating the state for
viable. 6 4
relinquishing lands where the state's claim appeared more
The act also provided for public recreational surface use of navigable
waters. 65
The 1987 Act sought to achieve these ends by, inter alia, providing
for: (1) "an uncompensated quitclaim of the state's equal footing
interest in all watercourses" except the Colorado, Gila, Salt and Verde
Rivers; (2) a $25 per acre fee by which a record titleholder could
obtain from the state a quitclaim deed for all of the state's equal
footing interests in lands in or near the Gila, Salt or Verde riverbeds;
(3) conveyance of the state's equal footing interest in any state land
patent issued after the statute's effective date; and (4) the state's equal
footing claims to be subject to statutory and equitable time bars, from
which the state was previously exempt.
In Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell,
representatives of both taxpayers and recreational users of Arizona's
riverbeds successfully challenged these provisions as violating both the
Public Trust Doctrine and the "gift clause" of the Arizona
Constitution. '
The legislature responded to Hassell by creating a commission to
investigate the navigability of the state's watercourses. This move
subsequently provided the basis for legislation disclaiming the state's
"right, title or interest based on navigability and the equal footing
The wildlife conservation
doctrine" to the beds of several streams.
organization Defenders of Wildlife challenged the statutory standards

160. Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 162 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1992).

161. Id. at 161.
162. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 727.
163. Hassel4 837 P.2d at 162 (citing H.B. 2017, 1987 Leg., First Regular Sess. (Ariz.

1987)).
164. Id.

165. Id.
166. Id. at 162-63.
167. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 727 (citing Hassell, 837 P.2d at 173). ARIz.
CONST. art. IX, § 7 states in relevant part, "neither the state, nor a subdivision shall...
make any donation to any individual, [association], or corporation ......
168. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 727 (internal quotations omitted).
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for determining navigability enacted in 1994 ("1994 Act"), 69 as
contrary to the federal navigability-for-title test and "deliberately
designed to defeat trust claims." 7 '
The Arizona Court of Appeals agreed and invalidated the statutory
standards. The court first rejected an argument that the state's prior
appropriation system was "irreconcilable with the state's equal footing
claims based on navigability," which the Farm Bureau argued was
impossible to separate from the riparian water rights doctrine. 7' The
court responded that, although both equal footing and riparian rights
are common law doctrines and invoke "'navigability' to define the
scope of their respective applications, they are two distinct systems
that
72
address two different issues-water use versus land ownership.'
The court then identified conflicts between the statutory standards
and the federal DanielBall navigability-for-title test. 73 For example, the
1994 Act required "clear and convincing evidence" as proof of a
stream's navigability for title. 1'' But the court cited an Eighth Circuit
case establishing a "preponderance" of the evidence as the requisite
burden of proof.17 In fact, the court suggested only a "scintilla" of
evidence might be sufficient proof of navigability. 76
Additionally, in the 1994 Act, the court found several
presumptions and evidentiary limitations that essentially prohibit a
determination of navigability in conflict with the federal test.'17 The
provision that if any "portion or reach of a watercourse" is found nonnavigable, the entire watercourse is presumed non-navigable was
78
among the presumptions the court found violative of federal law.1
The court cited Supreme Court precedent finding navigability
established in part of a waterway might be enough to support
navigability for the entire watercourse. 79 The 1994 Act also established
the presumption that a watercourse was non-navigable unless it was

169. A~iz. REv. STAT. § 37-1128 (West Supp. 2001) (original version at 1994 Ariz.
Sess. Laws, ch. 277, §§ 1-14 (effective April 25, 1994)).
170. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 728 (internal quotations omitted).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 728 n.4.
173. Id. at 731-37.
174. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 37-1128 hist. & stat. n.(B), (D), (G) (West Supp. 2001).
175. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 731 (citing North Dakota v. United States, 972
F.2d 235, 237-38 (8th Cir. 1992)).
176. Id. at 731-32 (citing Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1971) (finding
susceptibility for navigation supported solely on evidence that farmers had transported
livestock across a lake). But see, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 972 F.2d at 238-40
(implying more than a "scintilla" of evidence is required by holding an isolated tie
drive in unusually high water, the historical use of ferries for transportation across the
river, present-day recreational canoe use, previous boat use by Indians and
inconclusive evidence from explorers' journals combined did not support a finding of
navigability).
177. Id. at 732.
178. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 37-1128 hist. & stat. n.(B) (West Supp. 2001).
179. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 732 (citing United States v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 410 (1940)).
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susceptible for commercial trade, as well as travel. 80 To the contrary,
the court found the federal test did not require both trade and travel,
The court rejected the
nor did it require a commercial nexus."8
statute's presumption of nonnavigability for waters never used for
profitable commercial enterprise." It also rejected the presumption
of nonnavigability for waters not used by "' [vessels customarily used
for commerce on navigable watercourses [at statehood], such as
keelboats, steamboats or powered barges'." 8 3 Instead, the court
adopted a federal district court standard that "'ordinary modes of
trade and travel,'" as set forth in the DanielBall test, "are not fixed and
need not be construed with reference only to the 'ordinary modes of
trade and travel' in existence" at statehood.' 84 With respect to the
presumption that recreational-rather than commercial-boating and
fishing rendered a watercourse non-navigable, 5 the court adopted the
Ninth Circuit and the New York Court of Appeals' liberal construction
of recreational use consistent with the federal standard.8 6
To bolster its position, the court held "determinations regarding
the tide to beds of navigable watercourses in equal footing cases must
begin with a strong presumption against defeat of state's title."'8 7
Additionally, "the equal footing doctrine is co-existent with a strong
presumption of state ownership."

88

Furthermore, the court held that

the conflict between state and federal law rendered the Act's
navigability standards invalid under the Supremacy Clause and the
preemption doctrine.'89
Whereas other jurisdictions have based the public trust on state
ownership of navigable waters,' 90 Arizona emphasized the state's
property interest in the land beneath navigable waters. In Colorado,
180. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 37-1128 hist. & stat. n.(C)(1) (2001).
181.

Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 732 (citing Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9,

11(1971)).
182. Id. at 733 (citing ARIz. REv. STAT. § 37-1128 hist. & stat. n.(D)(2) (West Supp.
2001)).
183. Id. at 733-34 (citing ARiz. REv. STAT . § 37-1128 hist. & stat. n.(D)(3) (West
Supp. 2001)).
184. Id. at 734 (citing Alaska v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 455, 463 (D. Alaska
1987)).
185. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 37-1128 hist. & stat. n. (D) (5) (West Supp. 2001).
186. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 734-35 (citing Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d

1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1989) ("'To deny that.., use of the River is commercial because
it relates to the recreation industry is to employ too narrow a view of commercial
activity"'); Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 706 N.E.2d 1192, 1194 (N.Y.
1998) (".. .evidence of the river's capacity for recreational use is in line with the
traditional test of navigability, that is, whether a river has a practical utility for trade or
travel."). In following these recent precedents, the court noted two prior cases where
federal courts declined to find navigability based solely on recreational boating and
fishing activities. These cases were nineteenth century decisions, while a third was
decided in 1935. Defenders of Wildlfe, 18 P.3d at 734.
187. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 737 (citing United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 34
(1997); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935)).
188. Id. (citing Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284 (1997)).

189. Id.
190. See Discussion infra Part V.
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although Chief Justice Mullarkey once noted that the Colorado
Supreme Court has not recognized a public trust related to water,9' the
court has not addressed whether the public trust might apply to the
lands beneath navigable waters in this state. Nor has Colorado
established a system for making particularized determinations as to the
navigability of any of its watercourses.'9 2 If Colorado adopted Arizona's
reasoning, the public's right to float on a given stream or river could
not be precluded without first ascertaining whether the state retains an
equal footing interest in the streambed based on a particularized
assessment of its navigability under the federal standard.
Furthermore, the issuance of a federal or state patent to a private
landowner for lands traversed by a navigable watercourse does not
necessarily defeat state title to such lands. 9 ' Nor is a state estopped
from claiming title to streambeds simply because it has not previously
asserted its ownership.'94 States in their sovereign capacity may use and
dispose of state owned lands as they elect.'
However, the public trust
doctrine dictates that the sale or conveyance of lands beneath
navigable waters is "subject to a reserved easement in the state for trust
purposes" unless "irrevocably conveyed in absolute private ownership"
after a legislative determination that such lands may no longer serve
trust purposes.196
In Nevada v. Bunkowski, the Nevada Supreme Court determined
the Carson Creek was navigable under the federal title test. The court
found the state held title to the creek bed in trust for public use,
notwithstanding claims of ownership by private landowners, pursuant
191. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 901
P.2d 1251, 1263 (Colo. 1995) (MullarkeyJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
192. See Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 739-41. In a separate opinion, Judge
Thompson concurred with the majority in requiring a "particularized assessment" of
the state's equal footing claims, consistent with federal standards for navigability for
title. Id. at 739. However, he objected to the presumption that equal footing lands
could not be alienated, arguing that in the arid west, conveyance of such lands into
private ownership would "not necessarily violate the public trust doctrine." Id. at 740
(analogizing Arizona statutory language providing "state waters belong to the public
and are subject to appropriation and beneficial use" to similar language in the
Colorado Constitution, which the Colorado Supreme Court construed as "'primarily
intended to preserve the historical appropriation system of water rights upon which
the irrigation economy in Colorado was founded, rather than to assure public access
to waters for purposes other than appropriation'.") (citing People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d
1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979) (discussed infra Part V)).
193. State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1236-38 (Nev. 1972).
194. Id. at 1238.
195. Id. at 1237 (citing United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54 (1926)).
196. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); see also Defenders of Wildlife, 18
P.3d at 730 n.9.
Although individual states are free to pass laws that address the disposition of
public trust lands, this power is subject to the obligation of the state to
preserve the trust. Thus, trust land may only be used in ways that promote
the trust's purposes or improve the public's use of the resource. In short, a
transfer of public trust property is valid as long as the grantee's use does not
impair or interfere with the public interest.
Id. (citing Ariz. Ctr. for law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 166-69 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1992)).
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to pre-statehood federal and state patents.9
Here, the court noted
that when the United States granted patents without restriction, it
"assented to... construction [of such patents] according to the local
law." 98 Thus, the court construed "unrestricted federal and state
patents by the same criterion."1" Like the Arizona court in Defenders of
Wildlife, the Nevada court established a presumption of state ownership
of lands beneath navigable waters as the starting point of its analysis.
The court quoted United States v. Oregon for the proposition that...
Dominion over navigable waters and property in the soil under them
are so identified with the sovereign power of government that a
presumption against their separation from sovereignty must be
indulged, in construing either grants by the sovereign of the lands to
be held in private ownership or transfer of sovereignty itself. For that
reason, upon the admission of a State to the Union, the title of the
United States to lands underlying navigable waters within the states
passes to it, as incident to the transfer to the state of local
sovereignty ....
200

Because the record did not rebut the presumption that "the
federal government held the subject lands in trust for the State of
Nevada ....
[T]he federal government did not have control over the
bed, and it would appear obvious that the federal patents conveyed
none of the submerged lands." 201 With respect to the state patents, the
court ruled, absent an express legislative determination to the
contrary, the state in its sovereign
capacity "did not grant away the
22
public land of the river bed."

1

In rejecting the landowners' claim that the state was estopped from
claiming title because Carson Creek was not included on a list of
legislatively declared navigable waters, the court stated that public
rights cannot "be impaired by an
estoppel growing out of a mere
2
failure to object to encroachment."

1

The Defenders of Wildlife and Bunkowski cases suggest Colorado
courts should reexamine the presumption that all of Colorado's rivers
and streams that flow through private property are non-navigable for
title purposes.
V. THE COLORADO CONSTITUTION AND THE PUBLIC TRUST
IN THE STATE'S WATERS
At least forty-two
jurisdictions
have recognized that the state holds
•
•
204201
206
an interest in its waters0 or streambeds
in trust for the public.
197. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at 1236-38.
198. Id. at 1236-37 (citing Wear v. Kansas, 245 U.S. 154 (1917)).

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 1237.
Id. (quoting United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935)).
Id,
Id. at 1238.
Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at 1238 (citing State v. Hutchins, 105 A. 519, 523 (1919)).
As discussed, infra this section, New Mexico and Wyoming, for example, have
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This trust responsibility gives rise to public use rights which preclude
riparian landowners from claiming exclusive and exclusionary rights to
surface waters even, in some jurisdictions, when the streambeds are
privately owned."7 Additionally, courts have held that a state has a
fiduciary obligation to the public to manage such trust assets, and this
obligation limits a state's ability to dispose of or disclaim the public's
declared that all waters within their boundaries are "public waters" for the purpose of
establishing public use rights notwithstanding streambed ownership.
205. See discussion supra Part IV. See, e.g., Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo.
1954) (holding the title to the bed of a non-navigable stream that the federal
government conveyed to a private landowner before statehood, was not absolute but
burdened with a public easement that entitled the public to fish by canoe and
wading); Collins v. Gerhardt, 211 N.W. 115, 118 (Mich. 1926) (holding lands beneath
navigable streams that the federal government ceded to the state and which the state
granted to private owners were impressed with a perpetual trust that secured the
public's rights to float, fish and hunt water fowl).
206. See Mobile Transp. Co. v. City of Mobile, 44 So. 976, 977 (Ala. 1907); Owsichek
v. Alaska Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 494-95 (Alaska 1988); Arizona
Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 162 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992);
Anderson v. Reames, 161 S.W.2d 957, 960 (Ark. 1942); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v.
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983); Lovejoy v. City of Norwalk, 152 A. 210,
212 (Conn. 1930); Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 492 So. 2d 339, 342
(Fla. 1986); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982); Kootenai Envtl.
Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983); People
ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773, 779 (Ill.
1977); State ex relO'Connor
v. Sorenson, 271 N.W. 234, 238 (Iowa 1937); Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl.
Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (La. 1984); Opinion of theJustices, 437 A.2d
597, 607 (Me. 1981); Caine v. Cantrell, 369 A.2d 56, 58 (Md. 1977); Opinion of
Justices to Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1098 (Mass. 1981); Bott v. Comm'n of Natural
Res., 327 N.W.2d 838, 860 (Mich. 1982); Nelson v. De Long, 7 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn.
1942); Cinque Bambini P'ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986), affid sub nom.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Elder v. Delcour, 269
S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. 1954); Gait v. Montana Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d
912, 915 (Mont. 1987); State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Nev. 1972); New
Hampshire Water Res. Bd. v. Lebanon Sand & Gravel Co., 233 A.2d 828, 829-30 (N.H.
1967); Lusardi v. Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass'n, 430 A.2d 881, 886 (N.J. 1981); New
Mexico ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 440 (N.M.
1945); Coxe v. State, 39 N.E. 400 (N.Y. 1895); State ex rel. Rohrer v. Credle, 369 S.E.2d
825, 828 (N.C. 1988); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation
Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 461 (N.D. 1976); Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224,
1227 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979); Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709, 711 (Or.
1979); Alburger v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 535 A.2d 729, 731 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988);
Jackvony v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554, 557 (R.I. 1941); Hobonny Club, Inc. v. McEachern,
252 S.E.2d 133, 135 (S.C. 1979); Hillebrand v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (S.D. 1937);
State ex rel. Cates v. W. Tenn. Land Co., 158 S.W. 746, 752 (Tenn. 1913); Cameron
County v. Velasquez, 668 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Colman v. Utah State
Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 635 (Utah 1990); State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128, 1130
(Vt. 1989); Darling v. City of Newport News, 96 S.E. 307 (Va. 1918), affid. 249 U.S. 540
(1919); Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987); Campbell Brown & Co. v.
Elkins, 93 S.E.2d 248, 260 (W. Va. 1956); Wis's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Dept. of Natural
Res., 271 N.W.2d 69, 72 (Wis. 1978); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145 (Wyo. 1961).
207. See, e.g., S. Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295,
1298 (Idaho 1974) (holding the public was entitled to boat, swim, hunt and engage in
any other recreational activity on any stream which was suitable for such public uses
regardless of streambed ownership). But see Brosnan v. Gage, 133 N.E. 622, 624 (Mass.
1921) (holding title to streambed entitled private landowner to assert exclusive fishing
rights, but that his title was impressed with a public easement for business and
pleasure boating).
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rights to such assets.
The jurisdictions that have recognized some form of public trust
doctrine have relied on several different, although often interrelated,
sources of authority. These include the Equal Footing Doctrine,
or state statutes declaring public
state constitutional provisions
ownership of the Waters within a state.21 ' Although the Colorado
Supreme Court has declined on more than one occasion to adopt the
public trust doctrine based on any of these or other theories,212 a
divided court in the 1979 Emmert case did not completely reject the
concept and left the door open for the legislature to do so.215
Additionally, other prior appropriation states in the West have relied
on constitutional language similar to that in Article XVI, section 5 of
the Colorado Constitution to create a public trust based on public
ownership of the state's waters. Specifically, section 5 provides " [ t]he
water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the
state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and
the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to
appropriation as hereinafter provided."
The Emmert majority construed section 5 as "primarily intended to
preserve the historical appropriation system of water rights upon
which the irrigation economy in Colorado was founded, rather than to
assure public access to waters for purposes other than
to
Specifically,
the
phrase
"'subject
appropriation. "21
appropriation' . .. simply and firmly establishes the right of
208. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 729 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)
("'[T]he leading nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions on state sovereignty
made it clear that the states owe a fiduciary obligation to the general public with
regard to the management of their sovereign resources,' which are . . . 'public trust'
lands.") (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988)); 4
WATERS AND WATER RiGHTs, supra note 57, § 30.01 (c).
209. See discussion supra Part IV.
210. See discussion of New Mexico and Wyoming Constitutions as compared with
Colorado's Constitution, infra this Part V.
211. For example, Texas and Mississippi have statutory standards for navigability
that some courts have interpreted as also defining waters to which the public has
recreational access. See Ryals v. Pigott, 580 So. 2d 1140, 1148-49 (Miss. 1990); Port
Acres Sportsman's Club v. Mann, 541 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); see also S.
Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295, 1297 (Idaho 1974)
(relying, in part, on a statute that allows the public to fish on streams capable of
floating logs of a certain dimension); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Co., 53 N.W.2d 514, 519
(Wis. 1952) (applying statute that declared streams that are "'navigable in fact for any
purpose whatsoever'.").
212. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (Groves, J., and Carrigan,
J., dissenting); Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 686 (Colo. 1905) (Steele, J., and Bailey,
J., dissenting). More recently, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Mullarkey remarked, in
dicta, "This court has never recognized the public trust with respect to water." Aspen
Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1263
(Colo. 1995) (MullarkeyJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
213. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1029 ("If the increasing demand for recreational space on
the waters of this state is to be accommodated, the legislative process is the proper
method to achieve this end.").
214. COLO. CONST., art. XVI, § 5 (emphasis added).
215. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1028 (reaffirmingHartman,84 P. at 686).
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The court buttressed this assertion with language

from Article XVI, section
6 providing that the right to divert water
"shall never be denied." 217
In dissent, Justice Groves construed section 5 as establishing that
the state's waters are "the property of the public and are dedicated to
the use of the people of the state."218 He interpreted "subject to
appropriation" as "a caveat establishing that appropriation for a
beneficial use is superior to other uses" without limiting other uses.2 19
Quoting extensively from Judge Bailey's dissent in the earlier Hartman
case, Justice Groves argued the waters of every natural stream were
public, "dedicated to the use of the people.., in such manner as they
see fit," subject only to the right of appropriation for beneficial
220
purposes.
Until the waters are appropriated and diverted from the stream, they
belong to the public. No stronger words could have been used by the
people than are used in this declaration. It is idle to say that the
waters of the streams are dedicated to the public for the purpose of
appropriation, because those are not 221
the words of the Constitution.
It is a grant made subject to that right.
Justice Groves' interpretation is consistent with the analysis of other

states' courts. 222
For example, Article 16, section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution
216. Id.
217. Id. (quoting Hartman, 84 P. at 686). By contrast, the Idaho Supreme Court
construed similar language as imposing no constraints on the state's park agency from
appropriating water for scenic and recreational purposes. State Dep't of Parks v.
Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 926 (Idaho 1974) (construing Article 15,
section 3, of the Idaho Constitution, which states: "'The right to divert and
appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall
never be denied'."). Although the Idaho case involved a stream flowing over public
land, it illustrates an alternate construction of constitutional language almost identical
to that which the Colorado court relied upon in Emmert to restrict public access to
unappropriated waters. Additionally, this language did not prevent the Idaho court
from allowing public use rights for "all recreational purposes" on waters deemed
navigable under a state definition of navigability, even where the streambed was in
private ownership. See S. Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d
1295, 1297-98 (Idaho 1974).
218. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1030.
219. Id.
220. Id. (quoting Bailey, J., in Hartman,84 P. at 690 (Steele, J., concurring)).
221. Id. (Groves, J., dissenting) (quoting Hartman, 84 P. at 690-91 (Bailey, J.,
dissenting)).
222. See, e.g., Owsichek v. Alaska Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 49198 (Alaska 1988) (construing ALAsKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3); Gait v. Montana Dep't of
Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 914-15 (Mont. 1987) (construing MONT. CONSr.
art. IX, § 3(3)); State exrel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421,
430-31 (N.M. 1947) (construing N.M. CONST. art. 16, § 2); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d
137, 145 (Wyo. 1961) (construing WvO. CONST. art. 8, § 1). But see State exrel. Meek v.
Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1364-65 (Kan. 1990) (analogizing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702
(1997) to MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3, but following Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1030, in holding
the public has no recreational use rights to non-navigable water overlying private lands
without landowner consent).
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provides "[t]he unappropriated water of every natural stream,
perennial or torrential, within the state of New Mexico, is hereby
declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for
beneficial use, in accordance with the laws of the state. Priority of
'
appropriation shall give the better right."23
The wording of this
provision is almost identical to that in Article XVI, section 5 of
Colorado's constitution. The New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted
this language as an affirmative statement of the public's ownership and
right to use all waters in the state until they are appropriated for
beneficial use.224
The New Mexico court also held that
unappropriated waters are "public waters," and riparian landowners
did not have the right to claim exclusive use rights.225 Therefore, the
court held the private owner of land adjacent to and beneath two nonnavigable streams could not exclude the public from using the waters
of a man-made lake that inundated his property. 6 To deny public use
of such water, the New Mexico court reasoned, "would be saying that
the public must first appropriate its own property, the very waters
reserved to it and which have always 'belonged' to it, subject,2 27of course,
to being specifically appropriated for private beneficial use.,
The New Mexico court also held that the state's authority over
public water is "plenary."228 Thus, dedicating waters for public
recreational uses does not constitute a "taking" even when such water
overlies private land.2 2 The court admonished that
23 0 to hold otherwise
would "confuse title to the land with that to water."
Like the New Mexico court, the Wyoming Supreme Court found
public ownership of all waters embedded in the state constitution. In
Day v. Armstrong,23 the court held the public had a right to float on
streams flowing through private property, but the public did not have
an unrestricted right to walk or wade on the streambeds of such
waters. 2322 Instead, walking or wading 33on streambeds was limited to
necessary incidents of recreational use.
In authorizing public use of

223. N.M. CONST. art 16, § 2 (emphasis added).
224. Red River Valley, 182 P.2d at 430-34 (acknowledging the similarities between
New Mexico and Colorado Constitutions, but rejecting the Colorado Supreme Court
majority's holding and reasoning in its Hartmandecision).
225. Id. at 427-28.
226. The New Mexico court affirmed title to the submerged lands was vested in the
riparian landowner, whose ownership could be traced to the Pablo Montoya Grant of
1869. Id. at 424-26. However, because the water belonged to the state, the court stated
"justice and common sense" dictated the federal government's confirmation of the
landowner's title to the lands did not purport to "destroy, or in any manner limit, the
right of the general public to enjoy the uses of public waters." Id at 432.
227. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
228. Id. at 467 (plurality on second motion for rehearing).
229. Id.
230. Red River Valley, 182 P.2d at 432.
231. 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
232. Id. at 151.
233. Id.
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any waters capable of floating watercraft of any kind,23 4 the court based
its conclusion "solely upon Wyoming's Constitutional
2 35 declaration that
all waters within the boundaries belong to the State."
The Wyoming court acknowledged a "clear case of divided
ownership of the river as an entity" exists when the state holds title to
the water and title to the bed and channel vest in the riparian
landowner.236 The court analogized such divided ownership to the
"horizontal division in land ownership" between surface and
subsurface areas for which "the enjoyment of the rights incident to
separate ,,237ownership may require easement in the property of
another.
Therefore, concomitant with state ownership of its waters,
"there must be an easement in behalf of the State for a right of way
through their natural channels for such waters upon and over lands
submerged by them."238
In prohibiting riparian landowners from interfering with or
curtailing public use, the court emphasized that it was not "creating a
new public right nor even ...giving initial recognition to an unused
public right."2 9 Rather, the court defended "a use long enjoyed by the
public" which belonged to them, but which riparian owners now
sought to deny them.
The Montana Supreme Court examined the Montana
Constitution, which has language similar to Colorado's, to find
authority for public use of the state's waters, including those overlying
private lands. 4' Like the New Mexico and Wyoming courts, the
Montana Supreme Court ruled public ownership precluded riparian
landowners from controlling surface uses.242
Unlike Wyoming,
however, Montana did not restrict public use to floating, but rather
authorized recreational use even on privately owned streambeds and
banks to the extent such
use is "necessary for the public's enjoyment of
243
its water ownership.
The New Mexico, Wyoming and Montana models serve to illustrate
234. Id at 145. ("When waters are able to float craft, they may be so used.").
235. Id. at 146; see WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 1 ("The waters of all natural streams,
springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the boundaries of the state, are
hereby declared to be the property of the state").
236. Day, 362 P.2d at 145.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 151.
240. Id.
241. Mont. Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170 (Mont.
1984) (construing MONT. CONST. art. IX § 3(3) ("All surface, underground, flood, and
atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state are the property of the statefor the
use of its people and are subject to appropriationfor beneficial uses as provided by law.")
(emphasis added)); accord Galt v. Montana ex reL Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731
P.2d 912, 915 (Mont. 1987); Mont. Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684
P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984).
242. Curran,682 P.2d at 170.
243. Galt, 731 P.2d at 915 (invalidating sections of a statute that would have allowed
activities not necessary to water-based recreational activities, but affirming the
constitutional basis for the state's public trust doctrine).
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that, if the Colorado legislature or courts recognized the public's right
to recreate on waters overlying private property, the Colorado
Constitution could serve as the foundation for this right-either
standing alone or in combination with other sources of authority.
VI. OTHER SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR THE RIGHT TO
FLOAT THROUGH PRIVATE PROPERTY
A. STATE NAVIGABILITY
As noted above, the federal government obtains its navigational
servitude authority by implication from the federal powers under the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.2"
State
navigational servitude authority is an implicitly reserved power under
the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution."'5 The
navigational servitude is an exercise of the state's police powers in
navigable waters to regulate public health, welfare and safety.246 State
navigational servitude authority is subordinate to the federal
government's authority, but in the absence of the federal
government's exercise of its navigational servitude, the state retains
full authority47 to control ownership and use of the waterways within its
boundaries.

One commentator has characterized state navigational servitude,
similar to the federal version, as "an easement in favor of the public to
use the water for navigation.",4 ' Alternatively, the privately-owned title
to the bed of a navigable waterway may be conceived as a qualified title
not held at the owner's absolute disposal, but subordinate to the
public's use of the overflowing waters for navigation.
Many states apply their own common law interpretation of
navigability to allow what is tantamount to a public easement for
passage, even where a stream is ,not navigable under the federal tests,
or where the federal tests are not applicable.
Given federal
preemption law, it would be futile for states to adopt a more restrictive
navigability standard than the federal standards.29 States, however,
may find additional rivers navigable under their own laws. 25 Colorado
°
courts have not yet set forth a state standard for navigability.

Colorado allows for the development of a common law standard

244. See discussion supra Part II.
245. Jessie H. Briggs, NavigationalServitude as a Method ofEcologicalProtection,75 DIcK.
L. REv. 256, 260 (1971).

246. Id. at 256.
247. Daniel J. Morgan & David G. Lewis, The State Navigation Servitude, 4 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 521, 521-22 (1969); see also Briggs, supra note 245, at 256.
248. Id. at 522.
249. See, e.g., People v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483, 494 (Colo. 1990); see also, Defenders of
Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); discussion supra Part IV.
250.

See, e.g., People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979). One of the stipulated

facts was that the stream reach was non-navigable. Thus, the navigability issue,
whether under federal or state standards, was avoided in Emmert. Id. at 1026.
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for navigability. Colorado adopted the common law of England "so far
as the same is applicable and of a general nature.",2 1 "English common
law gave all subjects rights to navigate and to make other uses of
waterways such as fishing and hunting."22 Under the English common
law, "[t]he one clear right of the public in the use of water was for
travel."5 3 More importantly, the United States Supreme Court has
confirmed that, under the English common law, the public had the
right of passage over waterways to which a private party held the title:
American law, in some ways, enhanced and extended the public
aspects of submerged lands. English law made a distinction between
waterways subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and large enough to
accommodate boats (royal rivers) and nontidal waterways (public
highways). With respect to the royal rivers, the King was presumed to
hold title to the river bed and soil while the public retained the right
of passage and the right to fish. With public highways, as the name
suggests, the public retained the right of passage, but title was
typically held by a private party.
This common law derived first from the law of the sea, then
2 55
became applicable to coastal waters, and then to inland waterways..
This doctrine applies to navigable
inland courses in all of the states,
•
'256
and is not limited to tidal waters.
Incorporating and following the
common law of England, the common law of navigability in Colorado
confirms the public's right to use navigable waterways.
The Colorado legislature has acknowledged the existence of a
common law of navigability. By providing that one does not commit a
criminal trespass on any "nonnavigablefresh water streams" in the state
unless one touches the bed or banks, the legislature distinguished
between streams that are navigable and those that are not for state law
purposes.25 ' The Colorado statutes do not define the terms "navigable"
and "nonnavigable" leaving it to the courts to define both kinds of
waterways. In United States v. Goodrich Farms Partnership258 the court
partially defined a non-navigable stream as a ditch.5 9
In two Colorado cases where navigability was not at issue and
where no navigability standard was applied, the court stated in dicta

251. COLO. REv. STAT. § 2-4-211 (2001).
252. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN ANUTSHELL 218 (3d ed.
253. 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 57, § 29.02(b).

1997).

254. Idaho v. Coeur d' Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 285 (1997).
255. 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 57, § 30.01(d) (2).
256. Id.; see, Steamer Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).

257. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-4-504.5 (2001) (emphasis added); see also discussion
supra Part III. By providing that it is a misdemeanor to obstruct a "waterway" or "any
other place used for the passage of persons, vehicles, or conveyances" when that
waterway or place is one "to which the public or a substantial group of the public has
access," the legislature has indicated that navigable streams in this state enjoy certain
protections. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 18-9-107(1)(a) (2001).
258. 947 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1991).
259. Id. at 908.
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that Colorado streams are not navigable. In Stockman v. Leddy,' 6° the
Colorado Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a statute
that authorized state scrutiny of federal acts to insure they did not
infringe upon the state's right to control the distribution of its own
waters .... 26' The court stated the "property right... in the natural
streams, and the waters flowing therein, has never been renounced or
relinquished by the state."262 The court also observed that the federal
government knew the natural streams of the state were
nonnavigable. 6 3 In making this observation, the court likely intended
to minimize the potential for federal infringement on Colorado water
resources. While the court did not apply a navigability standard, its
statement in Stockman is not a rejection of a state common law
navigability standard.
One year after Stockman, the Colorado Supreme Court in In re
German Ditch & Reservoir Co. 264 had to decide whether a mostly dry
stream augmented by return flows was subject to appropriation under
the Colorado Constitution.2 65 The court referred to streams as nonnavigable in the context of minimal stream flows, unrelated to the
legal question posed in the case, and without application of any test f'or
navigability.260 Thus, the court's reference is not binding on the state
common law of navigability because the court did not discuss that law.
By necessary implication, Colorado should adopt the English
common law standard of navigability in fact. Many other states have
either adopted the English common law standard or fashioned their
own hybrid common law definitions.
The following cases are
illustrative, not exhaustive.
In Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., the
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's development of a
common law definition of navigability.26 Idaho adopted a navigablefor-use test that is a blend of the traditional log-floating test and the
contemporary pleasure boat test. Although the private landowner
urged the court to adhere to only the federal navigability for title test,
the court unequivocally separated interests in real property-which
remained in the adjacent landowner-from the public's interests in
access and use:
[T]he question of title to the [creek bed] is not at issue in this
proceeding. This is not an action by the State of Idaho or respondent
[hunting and fishing club] to quiet title to the bed of a navigable
stream.... The federal test of navigability involving as it does
260. 129 P. 220 (Colo. 1912).
261. Id. at 221.
262. Id. at 222.

263. Id.
264. 139 P. 2 (Colo. 1913).
265. Id. at 5-9.
266. See id.

267. 528 P.2d 1295 (Idaho 1974).
268. Id. at 1297-98.
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property title questions, does not preclude a less restrictive state test
of navigability establishing a right of public passage....269
California adopted the pleasure boat test and rejected commercial
nexus as the test of state navigability in People v. Mack.270 California
started by adopting the English common law and has refined its
common law definition over time.27 ' While California also legislated
on the subject-designating certain rivers navigable-legislative action
did not supersede the common law doctrine or undercut the general
applicability of the principle set forth in Mack.2n California's test is
whether waters are "capable of being navigated by oar or motor
propelled small craft., 273 If so, "members of the public have the right
to navigate and to exercise the incidents of navigation in a lawful
manner at any point below high water mark...." 274 The court
enjoined riparian landowners from obstructing the river at issue to
hunting and fishing as it
prevent the public from using it for boating,
275
passed through the defendants' property.
New York also derived its definition of navigability from the
English common law. In Adirondack League Club v. Sierra Club,276 New
York's highest court held that if "a river is navigable-in-fact, it is
the fact that its banks
considered a public highway, 27notwithstanding
7
and bed are in private hands."
Oklahoma has also adopted a state common law navigability-in-fact
standard. 27 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held:
We are of the opinion and hold that the river in question is navigable
in fact and that plaintiff owns the land to the middle of the stream
but that the water is in the nature of a street or highway so that
people who get on the river without committing an act of trespass has
[sic] the right to boat on either side of the middle of the stream,
either up or down stream.
Because Colorado has yet to set a state standard for navigability, it
has yet to apply to Colorado waterways the state navigational servitude
other states have adopted. The experience of other states illustrates
that state navigation servitude may protect the right to float on
Colorado's rivers and streams.

269. Id. at 1298.
270. 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
271. Id. at 451.
272. Id. at 453.
273. Id. at 454.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 450.
276.
277.
278.

706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 1194.
Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1969).

279. Id. at 936.

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 5

B. ADVERSE POSSESSION
Colorado's "Public Highways" statute permits creation of "public
highways" by adverse public use of any "roads" for twenty consecutive
years without interruption or objection. 8 ' Colorado courts have
embraced, a broad, flexible definition of road and highway under
which many of Colorado's waterways could logically be "roads" or
"highways."
Western rivers historically were arteries for travel,
commerce, exploration and recreation.
From the Snake and
Columbia Rivers providing a road west for Lewis and Clark to the
Platte River forJohn C. Fremont to the Gunnison for Torrence and his
party in Colorado, rivers have met and still do meet the practical
definition of a road.
The courts have long viewed rivers as highways.""' According to a
recent edition of Black's Law Dictionary, "[i]n [a] broader sense,
[highway] refers to any main route on land, wateror the air."282 In an
earlier edition, Black's states that "a river is called a 'highway'...
Similarly, "highway" has been defined as "a generic term frequently
used in a very broad sense... for all kinds of public ways, whether by
land or by water. 2 4 Thus, the very definition of highway includes
waterways.
In Hale v. Sullivan, the Colorado Supreme Court construed the
term "road" in the Colorado Constitution to include an airport
landing strip. " The court adopted a broad definition of "road" which
included "ferries, canals and navigable rivers.... ,,286 The court rejected

the argument that the term should be limited to the common usage or
to the definition of road at the time the Colorado Constitution was
adopted, and reasoned that the "word has a much broader meaning
and may be said to include 'overland ways of every character' ... [and
that] airports of this nation are links in the transportation system" and
are thus "logically within the term 'roads'.. . 281 Moreover, the cases
280. COLO. REv. STAT. § 43-2-201(1)(c) (2001).
281. See, e.g., Utah v. U.S., 403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971) (ranchers used river as a highway to
transport cattle); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 645 (1970) (holding
navigable waterways "shall be and remain public highways... for the public purposes
of commerce, navigation and fishery..."); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143
(Minn. 1893) (declaring waters "public highways"); Gaston v. Mace, 10 S.E. 60, 63 (W.
Va. 1889) (referring to the public use of streams as "highways").
282. BLAcK's LAw DIcrIoNARY 656 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). The definition
of "highway" further states, in part:
The term "highway," as generally understood, does not have a restrictive or a
static meaning, but it denotes ways laid out or constructed to accommodate
modes of travel and other related purposes that change as customs change
and as technology develops, and the term "highway," as it is generally
understood, includes areas other than and beyond the boundaries of the
paved surface of a roadway.
Id.
283. BLAcK's LAwDIcnoNARY862 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
284. 39A C.J.S. Highways § 1(1) (2001).
285. Hale v. Sullivan, 362 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1961).
286. Id. at 405 (emphasis added).
287. Id.

Issue 2

STHE RIGHT TO FLOAT

,the court quotes and relies upon from other jurisdictions expressly
compare airports to docks and wharves for boating.2
This suggests
that Colorado courts would consider waterways to be roads.
In Simon v. Pettit, the Colorado Supreme Court relied upon Hale in
interpreting "road" and "public highways" under the Public Highways
statute.2 9 After discussing how airport landing strips are part of the

general "transportation system," the court summarized as follows:
Hale stands for the principle that, in certain situations, a broad
definition of what constitutes a road should be adopted. In other
situations, however, a more restricted definition may be warranted.
We reaffirm our previous statement in Hale that the scoge to be given
the word depends upon the context in which it appears.

The opinion held that narrow footpaths do not constitute roads, but
cautioned that "the footpaths in question are not 'roads'. .. " only after
studying their factual context.2'

Accordingly, Colorado courts have

found public "roads" under Colorado Revised Statutes § 43-2-201 for
transportation ways of all character and based upon public uses that
include recreationm
The other jurisdictions that have considered the issue have treated
rivers as public highways or as subject to adverse possession by public
use. For example, in Buffalo River Conservation & Recreation Council v.

National Park Service, a trial court found that under Arkansas state law,
the public obtained a prescriptive easement on a river by canoeing23
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed,
holding that "in the same way a public highway can be obtained by
prescription, a public right-of-way has been established in the River."
The Court of Appeals held that the Arkansas cases finding prescriptive
rights-of-way on land were directly analogous to rights-of-way over non-

navigable streams and their beds.
The Mississippi Supreme Court applied a similar analysis in
holding that "[w]here the public has enjoyed access to waters for in

288. Id. at 404-05 (quoting Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 11 S.W.2d 1045 (Mo. 1928);
Hesse v. Rath, 164 N.E. 342 (N.Y. 1928)).
289. Simon v. Pettit, 687 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Colo. 1984) (interpreting COLO. REv.
STAT. § 43-2-201 (1973)).
290. I& (citations omitted).
291. Id. (emphasis added).
292. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 981 (Colo. 1984)
(unimproved dirt road adversely possessed by public recreational use); Shively v. Bd.
of County Comm'rs, 411 P.2d 782, 782-84 (Colo. 1966) ("a rugged mountain trail"
accessed by the public on foot, horseback, "traversed at least part way by jeep in
modern times," and used for recreation and hauling lumber, deemed a public road).
293. Buffalo River Conservation & Recreation Council v. Nat'! Park Serv., 558 F.2d
1342, 1344-45 (8th Cir. 1977).
294. Id. at 1345.
295. Id.; see also State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 659-60, 663-65 (Ark. 1980) (court
did not find it necessary to determine whether public had acquired prescriptive
easement for use of river as the public's recreational use was adequate to find the river
navigable).
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excess of ten consecutive years, those waters belong to the state by
adverse possession, to be held in trust for the people."26 As in Buffalo
River, the court in Dycus explicitly noted that while the "law well
recognizes that roadways may become public by prescription.... By
analogy, waters may similarly become public." 97
In Elder v. Decour, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the river
in question was non-navigable for purposes of title (i.e., the owner of
the stream banks owned the stream bed), but did not rule on the
broader definition of navigable used for purposes of regulation.299
Instead, the court examined whether the "land within the water area
of the river was a public highway and so subject to an easement for
public travel by boat and wading.... 2 99 In so doing, the court
summarized various cases in which public use of the river resulted in
the "right of the public to use a stream as a public highway .... "' 00 The
court ultimately concluded there was no trespass because the river in
question was public "and the submerged area of its channel.., is a
public highway for travel and passage by floating and by wading ....
VII. CONCLUSION

Across the West, most other states have recognized the right of
citizen access to float on rivers and streams under legal authorities that
would also support, or arguably compel, recognition of such rights in
Colorado. Opponents of public access rely primarily on two flawed
assumptions: first, that all Colorado streams are non-navigable; and
second, for that reason, riparian landowners possess absolute title, free
from any state property interest, to the beds beneath all waters flowing
through private property. At best, such declarations are premature
because the Colorado courts have not had to rule on the navigability
of any of the state's watercourses, which is necessarily a fact-based
inquiry not subject to general pronouncements. More significantly,
public access opponents ignore potential conflicts with the federal,
constitutionally-based, navigational servitude and equal footing
doctrines, as well as Colorado statutes and case law that also can
establish public access rights.
Our neighbors in Wyoming, New Mexico and Utah, among other
western states, including Montana, Idaho and California, protect the
right of public access to their waterways. These states have recognized
that the public use of waterways is not a new right; it dates to the days
of explorers and settlers. Moreover, it is a right that existed at
common law, which both predates private claims to absolute title to an
296. Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486, 501 (Miss. 1990).
297. Id. at 501 n.69.
298. Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17, 22-23 (Mo. 1954); see also State ex rel. Meek v.
Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1362-63 (Kan. 1990) (right of passage on river subject to adverse
possession; test not met under facts presented).

299. Elder,269 S.W.2d at 24.
300. Id. at 25.
301.

Id. at 26.
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inherently public resource and precludes private interests from
interfering with the public's right of access to those resources. For the
Colorado courts to formally recognize such a right would place the
state and its boaters right where they belong-in the mainstream.

